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The article attempts to provide an understanding of the phenomenon of conflict in 
the Horn of Africa. It identifies and dicusses the political factor as the root cause of 
the problem of peace and security in the subregion. The paper does not argue that 
thee is a gap of literature on the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The argument it is 
trying to present is taht many of the works on the subject taht the author has 
consulted and reviewed concentrate on conflict markers such as ethnicity, region, 
religion, etc. This way of understanding of the source of conflicts has the effect of 
obscuring the primacy of politics as a major root cause of the problem. The 
approach of academic resaerch on the conflict problematic must not be based on 
the horizontal and asymmetrical society-society relations; but rather on the 
asymmetrical and undemocartic state-society relations. Based on this, the 
conclusion of the article, as the scenarios in the conclusion clearly illustrate, is taht 
in conflict studies giving little or no attention to the role of state and its institutions 
as a amjor root cause to conflicts and instabilitieswithin and between states in the 
Horn of Africa would make it difficult to suggest practical/realistic copping 
strategies of dealing with the problem of peace and security in the subregion. 
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Things of positive value seldom come out of scholarly literature or media reports 
on the Horn Africa. The sub-region has always been associated with crises of far-
reaching consequences. Often reported about the Horn of Africa have been intra-
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state and inter-state conflicts, recurrent drought and hunger or a socio-economic 
and political crises. Although the colonial legacy is often cited as responsible, the 
cause for the persistent lack of security in the Horn of Africa lies in the socio-
economic and political policies of the post-colonial regimes. The sub-region has 
passed through several devastating civil and inter-state disputes and violent 
conflicts/wars, which in some cases are yet to be settled. These have consumed 
considerable human life and material resources, political energies and policy 
attentions of political leaders of the states of the sub-region. Significant resources 
have been diverted from development endeavours to war efforts. Needless to say, 
the prevalence of constant and continuous instability and insecurity has made the 
Horn of Africa one of the world’s peripheries economically, socially and 
politically.  
On the other hand, the conflicts and instabilities in the Horn of Africa have 
not attracted serious scholarship with regard to their root causes. Although there is 
no shortage of literature on the conflicts in the sub-region, many of the works do 
not explain their root causes systematically. While some studies emphasize 
religion, others underline resources, ethnicity, or politics. Needless to say, since the 
end of the Cold War debates on issues of conflict in general and the Horn of Africa 
in particular tend to emphasize ethnicity. While ethnicity as a factor of conflict can 
not be denied, the trend to overstate it, however, has the implication of obscuring 
the primacy of politics, i.e. the role of state which is at the centre of the 
contemporary conflicts that rock the sub-region.  
Peace and security study is not only about the existence or non-existence of 
war, but it, more importantly, is about economic security, mental/psychological 
peace and political and economic freedom of the people at both national and 
regional levels. What follows from this is that peace and security study is about 
democratizing the structures, institutions and operations of the state.  
The aim of this paper is to outline the causes of the conflict and insecurity in 
the Horn of Africa and suggest intra and inter-state conflict resolution strategies 
with a view of provoking further research on the subject. Main beneficiaries of this 
study are, thus, the academics, researchers in the field, consultants, policy analysts, 
and students interested in peace and security studies.  
 
Background  
The Horn of Africa both as a political concept and a physical entity does not lend 
itself for precise definition. The geographical extent of the sub-region and the 
number of countries that it consists of and thus its political map keep on 
perpetually changing. Conventionally, the Horn of Africa is understood as the area 
that comprises Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea (after its partition from 
Ethiopia in 1991), and these are sometimes referred to as “core countries” (Mesfin, 
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1999). When political, economic, and cultural factors are taken into consideration, 
Kenya and Sudan can be added to the list. Furthermore, the spillover of the 
political-economy of conflicts also extends the political map of the sub-region to 
other countries. The best example of this is Uganda’s accession to the Inter-
Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional organization 
established in 1986 with its headquarters in Djibouti. Egypt, a North African 
country, also is not less involved in the affairs of the Horn of Africa because of the 
factor of the Nile. The US’s “Greater Horn of Africa Initiative”, launched after the 
end of the cold-war also extends the region to the ‘Great Lakes’ region.  
The focus of this paper is the ‘core countries’, and Kenya and the Sudan. This 
is because of the fact that these countries have many things in common and 
whatever development takes place in each of them affects all others directly or 
indirectly. As Markakis (1998:5) has observed, the Horn is not only a geographic 
designation, but also a cultural and socio-economic entity and this is what makes it 
distinguishable from the adjacent regions. Yet, this does not mean that these states 
do not have differences. They differ, inter alia, in terms of level of economic 
development, territory and population size, human and natural resource base, 
regime ideology, state structure and political system. And sadly enough, the 
regional behavior of the states of the Horn have, more often than not, reflected 
these differences rather than the similarities.  
 
The Horn as a Cultural and Economic Zone 
The Horn countries geographically, economically, and culturally form an 
interconnected unit. As I have argued elsewhere the Horn of Africa forms “a 
cultural and economic zone” (Tafesse, 1998). Markakis (1998: 5) substantiates this 
by saying that the Horn is ‘a region with a multitude of physical, social, cultural, 
economic and other integrating features’. 
Socio-culturally, constant intercourse/interactions (both in peace and war) 
brought the peoples of the sub-region closer together. Many population groups of 
the Horn countries have mixed origins, speak related languages, and have close 
cultural and economic ties. The states of the Horn, except Ethiopia, are the result 
of the decolonization process in Africa in the post-Second World War period. In 
other words, the modern state system in the Horn of Africa, like in the rest of the 
continent, emerged in the political boundaries that were carved by the former 
colonial powers dividing peoples of the same ethnocultural groups into different 
political/legal jurisdiction. This has resulted in the existing complex ties across 
boundaries among the citizens of the states in the Horn. For instance, the Afar 
people are divided between Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. Tigrai speaking people 
straddle Ethio-Eritrean border. Similarly, Somali speaking peoples are divided 
between Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya. Ethiopia and Kenya share the 
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Oromo ethnic group. Furthermore, several other different population groups also 
span Kenya-Sudan, Ethiopia-Sudan, and Eritrea-Sudan frontiers. In general, the 
countries of the Horn of Africa that have common borders also share, at least, one 
group of people who claim to belong to the same language, religion, culture and 
mode of economic activity. 
Topographically, the Horn of Africa forms highlands, lowlands and highland-
lowland transition zones, each playing important role in many respects. While 
highlands are sources of rivers and areas of settled agriculture, the lowland areas 
are predominantly characterized by pastoralist mode of production, where 
livestock raising is the major economic activity. The highland-lowland interaction 
zones form a dynamic transition not only of people’s mode of life–sustaining 
activities but also of natural resources and population migrations. Thus, there is 
intensified exchange of products and common use of shared natural resources. 
Such interactions are not, however, always peaceful as the shared resources are 
scarce on one hand and there are, unfortunately, no agreed upon rules and 
regulations of resource sharing on the other. Moreover, the fact that the Horn of 
Africa is situated in the geoponics of the Nile Valley, the Red Sea and the Indian 
Ocean has given it strategic importance, making it one of the scenes that always 
attract foreign powers colliding and colluding among themselves to establish 
hegemony.  
Economically, the sub-region represents a natural economic zone. Generally 
speaking, the Horn is a region of resource scarcity which the growth of population 
and the worsening environmental degradation further aggravate. Though there are, 
of course, variations among states of the sub-region in terms of resource 
endowment, taken as a whole however, there are considerably sufficient resource 
potential (both human and economic) that could be developed and utilized for 
mutual interest; realization of this, however, requires peaceful and cooperative 
relationships within and between the countries of the Horn of Africa sub-region. 
Lack of cooperation in the utilization of the available potential resources, such as 
grazing lands, rivers, and seaports, has rendered nearly all countries of the sub-
region to be among the poorest economies of the world. Environmental 
degradation and vulnerability to recurrent drought and hunger, accompanied by 
lack of agreed upon policies for resource use and management resulted in food 
insecurity and conflicts. The states of the Horn are share problems of conflict and 
poverty, and also whose opportunities of development are closely interlinked.  
 
The state of conflict in the Horn of Africa 
To reiterate, the Horn is a sub-region of protracted conflicts and instability. Over 
the past six decades there was no single year when the sub-region had been free 
from conflict, be it intra-state or inter-state. What distinguishes the Horn of Africa 
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is the fact that it has hosted the longest civil wars in Africa: the civil war in 
Ethiopia and the Sudan. In Ethiopia, the civil war between the central government 
and the Eritrean secessionists ran for 30 years (1961-1991). The North-South 
conflict in the Sudan that began after the country’s independence in 1956 
continued until very recently, with only a ten-year period of détente (1972-1983) 
achieved through the Addis Ababa Peace Accord, brokered by Emperor Haile 
Selassie. Resumed in 1983 because of policies of the Nimeiri regime, the North-
South conflict in the Sudan continued until 2005 when the Compressive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed between the government and the mainstream 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). On the bases of the CPA the 
Southern Sudanese held referendum in January 2011 in which, according to the 
referendum commission’s temporary report, 99.57% voted for the independence of 
Southern Sudan. The final fate of the result of the referendum and the implications 
of separation of the Sudan into two sovereign states for the politics of the Sudan 
and the region at large remains to be a new serious cause of concern.  
The condition in Somalia is much different. The post-colonial Somali state, 
which emerged with the merger of the former British and Italian Somalilands in 
1960, has collapsed with subsequent diffusion of power among various warlords 
that continue fighting for control of resources. What is unique about the conflict in 
the post-1991 Somalia is the fact that it is among several clan based warlords, to 
which the central government is not a party: Somalia does not have any effective 
central government since 1991. The conflict is among several clan based warlords. 
The reason for the continuity of statelessness and instability in Somalia lies in the 
fact that the contending warlords could not cooperate to form a central government 
by consent, nor could one of the warlord groups assert power and dictate its will 
upon the others to the effect of creating a central authority. The Djibouti sponsored 
Arta conference that established a transitional government for Somalia could not 
last because it lacked legitimacy at home (because it was not all inclusive) and 
encountered unfavorable sub-regional environment. The Nairobi Peace-Process 
succeeded in persuading all Somali factions to form a joint parliament in exile for 
which the daunting task ahead has also been how to form a unity Government of 
Somalia. This difficulty was evidenced by the war between the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UIC) supported by international terrorism and the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) of Somalia supported by Ethiopia, which had militarily 
intervened in Somalia from 2006-2009.  
What is evident from the above discussion is that after the end of the cold-war 
Somalia and the Sudan became the epicenter of conflict in the Horn. This does not, 
however, mean that the other Horn states have been spared off conflicts in the 
post-cold war era. Ethiopia and Eritrea crossed swords from 1998-2000 (Tekeste 
and Tronvoll, 2000). No matter what the differences in the degree of intensity, 
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nearly all of the states of the subregion have been fighting with their domestic 
opposition. Djibouti has not been able to solve its delicate ethnic political balance; 
feeling being marginalized, the ethnic Afar has always been pressing the Issa-
dominated government for equitable share of power in an open political space. The 
Afar dissatisfaction in Djibouti led to civil war in the 1990s and this was not 
settled until the 2001 peace accord reached between the Afar based Front for 
Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and the Government of Djibouti. 
The government of the youngest state of Eritrea, under the sole control of the de 
jure one-party (EPLF, renamed ‘the Peoples’ Front for Democracy and 
Justice/PFDJ in 1994)’ is highly vulnerable to social and political conflicts. 
Eritrea’s military defeat in the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war (Tekeste and 
Tronvoll, 2000) also has significantly eroded the PFDJ regime’s legitimacy based 
on mere ‘libratory ideology’. 
Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has been experimenting with ethnic federalism and 
multiparty democracy. The EPRDF-led government has restructured the Ethiopian 
state dividing it into nine self-governing regions on language and ethnic criteria. A 
plethora of political parties, the majority of which are based on ethnic 
constituencies, have also emerged. The policy of restructuring the country along 
ethnic federalism, as the regime and the proponents of the policy argue, has been 
sought as a solution to the country’s outstanding problems of conflict. But, 
although there have been mixed evaluations from different angles, both the ethnic 
federal structure and the multiparty system are not working fairly well in this 
regard. Even though there has not been any acknowledged open military conflict in 
Ethiopia since 1991, the instituted federal structure has yet to provide the country 
with a measure of political stability. Differently put, despite the institutionalization 
of ethnicity as state structure and as a political party organizing factor, still there 
are dissatisfied ethnic-based opposition movements demanding either for a more 
open political-space, if in effect not for exit.  
Kenya, though appeared to be an island of stability, has not been spared off 
conflict in the sub-region. As Oyugi (2001:32) points out, it has experienced left-
right ideological polarization, secessionist tendencies, and ethnic conflicts. In fact, 
compared to many of the post-colonial states in Africa, Kenya witnessed regime 
stability, save the recent post-election violence. In spite of the phenomenon of life-
presidency, Kenya is one of the few African countries that were not affected by 
coups d’etat (military or civilian), once considered as a dominant mode of regime 
change in the continent. Only two acknowledged coup attempts were reported in 
Kenya: in 1971 and in 1982. Kenya’s relative tranquility is not because it has a 
democratic system of administration. The regimes of President Jomo Kenyatta and 
his successor Daniel Arap Moi were authoritarian. Until recently, the Kenyan 
African National Union (KANU), the de jure single-party, dominated the country’s 
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political scene. This significantly negatively influenced state-society relations in 
the country. Kenya also has been the only consistently pro-Western nation in the 
Horn of Africa. In its domestic and foreign policies, Kenya had never shifted 
positions between the cold-war ideological and military blocs. The West’s security 
assistance and the authoritarian regimes’ ability to establish tight control over the 
society were the factors for Kenya’s relative stability. 
However, since the early 1980s Kenya has been no less chaotic than the other 
countries of the Horn. Particularly after the 1982 coup attempt, the Moi regime’s 
increasing centralization of power for fear of insecurity and, corruption of 
government officials, unemployment, and the politicization of ethnicity has 
changed Kenya’s political landscape (Oyugi, 2001:32). Social violence – banditry, 
hijacking, robbery, murder, etc. – in urban areas and government’s discriminatory 
rural land policy incited conflicts in Kenya. The spillover effects of the conflicts in 
the region also affected the country. Hundreds of thousands of refugees produced 
by conflicts within and between neighbouring countries not only created social and 
economic problems, but also political and security concerns for Kenya (Khadiagala 
and Lyons, 2001:108). And since the 1990s Kenya is one of the target countries of 
international terrorism in eastern Africa.  
 
Causes of Conflicts in the Horn: Against the Conventional 
Understanding  
Peace and security studies need clear and correct understanding of the underlying 
causes of conflicts. Correct understanding of core issues at stake for parties in 
conflict enables students of peace and security studies to suggest realistic 
strategies/mechanisms of conflict resolution and post-conflict peace management. 
In view of this, although the issue of conflict in the Horn of Africa has 
significantly attracted scholarship, much of the literature on the subject have not 
systematically addressed and explained the root causes of the conflicts. In short, 
there exists a lacuna in terms of clear and careful understanding of the origin of the 
conflicts within and between states of the sub-region. Ethnicity, religion, region, 
border disputes, scarce resources, or armed struggle for state power have been held 
as factors responsible for the conflicts in the Horn. For example, John Markakis, 
one of the observers of the affairs of the Horn of Africa, has authored, co-authored, 
or edited several books on conflicts in the Horn of Africa under different titles in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
The traditional notion of security is to relate it with the prevalence or absence 
of armed conflict in society or between societies. This view aside, the purpose here 
is to understand the political economy of security that underpins the role of the 
state and its institutions. In other words, security is inseparable from the issue of 
democracy and development (Jinadu 2000: 4). While bringing the role of the state 
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into the focus of his analysis he then notes that the absence of peace and security in 
Africa occurs when the state fails to perform its ‘sovereign responsibility’ (Jinadu 
(2000: 2; Deng et.al. 1996) of mediating the “[s]tructurally induced and 
institutionalized inequalities“. The conclusion Jinadu (2000: 2) makes is that “...the 
problem of peace and security in Africa is bound up with the nature and character 
of the modern state and its role and position in the national and international 
society.” Simply put, insecurity is a condition where the state as an institution for 
mediating conflicts does not perform enough its responsibility but instead engages 
in hegemonic drives for personal or group interest. Hence, the search for security 
in society as well as between societies must not be conceived of apart from taking 
into account the nature of the state and the role of its institutions. Therefore, it is 
not with mere coincidence that scholars on the subject suggest that sovereignty 
need to be redefined (Deng et.al. 1996).  
It seems that the literature on the issue of peace and security in the Horn of 
Africa has been influenced by the winds of global political change: the end of the 
Cold-War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Following the disintegration 
of the Soviet Empire and its East European socialist allies that led to the birth of a 
number of ethnic-based states, the general tendency of scholarship is to make 
ethnicity central to the discourse on the issue of instability in the developing parts 
of the world. This has significantly obscured the root cause of conflicts that plague 
many regions of the world. The Horn of Africa is not an exception. Conflicts have 
been fought in the sub-region under the name of nation/nationality, ethnicity, 
region, religion, or classes. But, in the light of the argument this author is making, 
these are manifestations or triggering factors, not the root causes of the conflicts. 
As Markakis (1998) notes, “the state is the cause, the bearer of ultimate 
responsibility for outbreak of conflicts in two important ways: competition for 
resources under the condition of great scarcity, and control of the allocation and 
monopoly use of the scarce resources”. This passage underscores the fact that 
politics is the major cause of the conflicts, regardless of the form of their 
manifestations.  
Mesfin (1999) asserts that the major conflicts in the Horn have not been 
fought horizontally between different ethnic or religious groups. They are rather 
politically motivated clashes between the state and society. As Markakis (1998) 
sunccintly puts, it is the outcome of incompatible interests in which the State and 
other actors that fight for its control are involved. To be more precise, while 
politics is the ultimate cause, ethnicity and religion are factors of mass moblization 
that are given prominence by the disgruntled political elites fighting against what 
Elsenhans (1996) calls the “state classes”. For example, despite ethnic and 
religious homogeneity of the Somali society, what has transpired in the post-1991 
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is the bloodiest conflict that ultimately led to State collapse and disintegration of 
that country.  
Ethnicity and religion feature prominently as the cause of conflict particularly 
where disparity in the share and control of national resources (political power and 
economy) correspond to ethnic and/or religious differences. From this point of 
view, while de-emphasizing the role of ethnicity and religion in conflict may be a 
risky exercise, over-emphasizing it would also create the risk of reducing the 
problem of conflict to the existence of ethnic and/or religious diversity per se. Both 
will have implications for conflict management and resolution efforts. Why has, 
ethnic diversity in the industrialized (developed) countries, for instance, not come 
out as a source of conflict? Why however ‘semi-peripheral’ countries of Europe 
like Spain under Franco’s rule experienced conflict that followed regional or ethnic 
fault lines? And why has this conflict lost much relevance and Spain transited to 
devolution and federal democratic welfare state in the post-Franco period? 
(Mangen 2001: 138). This clearly illustrates the political economy of conflict in a 
given society. Anywhere, ethnicity, religion, and other markers of group identity 
become a factor of conflict when political actors manipulate them as tools to 
mobilize people in the pursuit of specific political or economic ends.   
Elsenhans (1993:12) argues, “The ascendancy of religion as a political 
resource is the combined result of disappointment of the lower classes with the 
Western ideas (Revolution, Socialism, Statism)”. Particularly with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism, competing 
political elites (both wielders of state power and those in opposition) in the Third 
World are devoid of populist ideology. Liberalism has also declined in importance 
due to the weakness of the state to perform well in the realm of governance, the 
abuse of the cardinal principles of modern democracy by the ruling elite. Hence, 
there is no surprise if the discontented political classes have resorted to religion 
and/or ethnicity as an ideology of mass mobilization. In short, religion and 
ethnicity are brought to the fore as political instrument for political elite struggling 
to capture state power, the source of wealth, as well as social status.  
Difference in religion as an ideology also does not matter much in forging 
political alliance. For instance, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia supported Somali 
insurgent groups against President Siad Barre’s government before 1988, when the 
two authoritarian regimes signed an accord in which they vowed not to support 
each other’s dissident groups. The Islamic government of Sudan has been 
supporting the Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA), a Christian insurgent group 
fighting against the government of Uganda as a tit-for-tat policy, viz. to counter the 
Ugandan government’s support of the SPLM/A. Several anti-government 
movements in the Horn of Africa that have ethnicity and religion as political 
agenda have also forged alliances that cross-cut religious and ethnic boundary lines 
     Tafesse Olika  
 
 10
as part of their efforts to destabilize and weaken the regimes they fight against. In 
short, conflicts in the Horn cannot be defined in terms of “clash of civilizations”, to 
use Samuel Huntington’s most criticized phrase.  
As mentioned above, the Horn is a sub-region of cultural-mix whose peoples 
share several characteristics. There is no significant disparity in socio-economic 
development among the peoples of the sub-region. For example, it has been very 
common to explain the north-south conflict in the Sudan in racial and religious 
terms. It must be admitted that the development disparities between Northern and 
Southern Sudan – set in motion by the British colonial power as part of its divide-
and-rule policy – coincided with ethnic, religious, and regional differences. It 
must, however, be noted that the root of the north-south conflict that ran for three 
decades (1956-2005), with of course 10 years interlude (1972-1983) as the result 
of Addis Ababa Agreement mediated by Emperor Haile Selassie, is the disparity in 
terms of access to state power and economic resources between the Northern and 
Southern political elites in the post-independence period. Similarly, the problem in 
Somalia, with its origin in the crisis of state-building process under the post-
independence Somali regimes, is the rivalry among different clan-based warlord 
factions for hegemony over economic resources for selfish interests. As Medhane 
(2002; 2004) contends, ‘control of land, ports, local markets, and export trade has 
been the bone of contention among the warlords in Somalia.’ Adewoye’s (2000: 
39) observation further advances this line of argument. He writes,  
 
[W]hilst the African predicament is often expressed in economic terms, it is 
really little more than “suprastructural” problem, grave as it has been. Africa’s 
crisis lies mainly in the political domain, in the structural sector from where 
poor or bad leadership often reflects adversely in all other sectors and facets 
of the political system and society. 
 
This logic of political-economy can also apply to explain inter-state conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa. As international borders in Africa are so artificial and so erratic, 
any state that wishes to create conflict with any of its neighboring states could use 
the border issue as a pretext. Border disputes that developed into full-scale inter-
state wars, however, have been very rare in Africa. In the context of the Horn, 
inter-state frontiers were delineated, but not demarcated, through agreements 
between Ethiopia and the former colonial powers – Britain, France and Italy. Here 
also overt efforts of armed forces of one state to invade the territory of another 
only have happened between Somalia and Ethiopia, and recently between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia.  
Even though they were fought under the name of ‘nationalism’ or ‘border 
disputes’, these wars have economic and political roots. Somalia’s drive in the 
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1960s and 1970s for “unification” of Somali-speaking peoples in the Horn of 
Africa was mainly spearheaded against the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. This was 
because the Ogaden, compared to Somalia, is better endowed with land and water 
resources that are necessary for sustainability of pastoralism, the main economic 
activity of the Somali people. The Ogaden is also said to be potentially rich in oil 
resources. The Juba, Ghenalle, and Wabi Shebelle rivers – all with their sources in 
eastern Ethiopian highlands – that provide Somalia with water all the year round 
traverse the Ogaden region. The only area where cultivation is practiced and has 
potential for irrigated agricultural development in southern Somalia is between the 
Juba and Wabi Shebelle rivers (Touval, 1963). As Laitin and Samatar lamented,  
 
If there are indeed major resources of oil in disputed territories, the issue of 
nationality of the nomads will pale to insignificance and the issue of military 
power to control the area will take precedence (Laitin and Samatar 1984: 34).  
 
In view of the hegemonic drive of the Somali state for resource control through 
annexing the Ogaden, the Somalis of the region were simply the pawn of this 
expansionist policy of the Somali state. In the same token, while Eritrea’s 1998 
invasion of Badme and its environs was driven by the ambitious policy of making 
Eritrea “the Singapore” of the Horn of Africa by the Issayas regime, the border 
issue was a passport to realize this policy.  
To recapitulate, conflicts in the Horn Africa are the result of bad political 
policies and praxis. The institution that is responsible for this is the state. Precisely 
speaking, the ‘state class’ that controls the government of the country in its zeal to 
accumulate and control economic resources is the prime source of conflicts and 
insecurity in the Horn. As Markakis has put: 
 
 
Since those who control the state have used its power to defend their own 
privileged position, the state has become both the object of conflict and the 
principal means by which it is waged. Dissident groups seek to restructure the 
state in order to gain access to its power, or failing that, to gain autonomy or 
independence. The ultimate goal of most parties to the conflict, of course, is 
to enlarge their share of resources commanded by the state. This is the real 
bone of contention and root causes of the conflict in the Horn, whether it is 
fought in the name of nation, region, religion, ethnicity, or clanship 
(Markakis, 1994: 217-8).  
 
Hence, there is “a clear correlation between exclusion from state power, reduced 
access to resources and the incidence of conflict” (Markakis, 1998:5). Those who 
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control the state power and the dissidents see the state as a “prize” to be won for it 
is the basis for accumulation of wealth and patronage that can establish and 
maintain a political base (Cliffe, 1999, 14). In the Horn of Africa, as both the 
wielders of state power and those who fight for it perceive politics as a zero-sum 
game, competition over the state power and economic resources is not amenable to 
compromise. The drive for gaining and retaining state power is always through the 
force of arms, what Samatar (1988: 157) calls “primitive rebellions, based on 
generic dislike for the existing order”. In sum, the core cause of conflict, fought at 
whatever level and degree of intensity is violent competition over irrationally 
managed and inequitably distributed national resources. Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa is the result of government policy failure.  
 
The Horn of Africa Conflict Inter-Linkage   
As government policies and practices bear the ultimate responsibility for conflicts 
in the Horn of Africa, nearly all the conflicts in the sub-region have internal origin: 
their sources lay in domestic political and economic issues. Conflicts within and 
between states in the sub-region are interconnected and, thus, have to be studied at 
broader regional context. The regional context, according to Deng, shapes their 
dynamics and influences the prospects for their management and resolution (Deng, 
1996:131). In the Horn of Africa, intra-state conflicts are just like a moving 
cyclone with significant repercussion at regional level. This means instability at 
one level has a spillover effect at the other. This in turn means conflict at one level 
of analysis influences or alters the structure of alliance of forces or actors at the 
other level. Put differently, while the regional context shapes the course and the 
outcomes of intra-state conflicts, intra-state conflicts in turn can be transformed 
into inter-state conflicts. In short, intra-state conflicts infect inter-state politics in 
the Horn of Africa.   
This conflict inter-linkage occurs for several reasons. To start with, in the 
Horn of Africa, “[w]hether in terms of refugees, arms flows, demonstration effects 
of nationalism, or as the base from which  opposition (including armed insurgency) 
is organized, neighbors are drawn into internal conflicts” (Deng, 1996: 147). To 
explain, the Horn of Africa is the “home and destination of refugees", that is, the 
states of the sub-region are both the producers and recipients of refugees. What 
must be mentioned here is the fact that refugees and refugee movements in the 
Horn sub-region are both effects and causes of conflict. The other thing that the 
refugees with political interests – for that matter, all refugees have political 
interests as they are products of conflicts/wars caused by bad government policies 
– organize themselves in countries of asylum and conduct political and military 
activities against the government of their origin. Hence, in addition to economic 
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and social problems they pose to recipient countries, their political and military 
activities in countries of asylum also provoke inter-state tensions and conflicts.  
Another factor for conflict inter-linkage thereby forming regional ‘conflict 
system’ has been the pattern of mutual insurgency support by the states of the sub-
region. This reciprocal insurgency support implies that local politics of the Horn 
countries have been played at the sub-regional level. In other words, this tit-for-tat 
policy in the inter-state politics of the Horn has produced a pattern of mutual 
intervention in the sub-region (Cliffe, 1999), thereby giving conflicts of internal 
origin a regional character.  
The classic example of uneasy inter-state relations as the result of mutual 
insurgency support has been between Ethiopia and Sudan. Before 1991 the two 
countries supported each other’s opposition movements as a strategy for containing 
the other’s policy of destabilization. This has obstructed the possibility of 
resolving not only domestic conflicts in the two countries, but also their 
relationship. Ethiopia and Sudan are countries that experienced the longest civil 
war in the Horn of Africa. The conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia also affected the 
regional politics. Given the domestic authoritarian politics and uneasy inter-state 
relations, anti-regime movements became the factor to link up the states of the 
Horn in a common ‘security-dilemma’, the condition in which the security measure 
taken by one state is seen as source of insecurity for the others (Cliffe, 1999). 
Easy availability of arms through illegal circulation is also an important 
condition for conflict inter-linkage in the region. If the cold-war superpowers 
poured military weapons to their respective clients (states or the opposition), the 
end of the global cold-war politics has not brought about a significant change in 
the equation. The end of the cold war has resulted in the expansion of sources of 
military weapons and armed actors. As a post-cold war study on military profile 
for IGAD countries indicates, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to the 
birth of new states willing to traffic arms to local actors in the developing world. 
The break-away states of the former Soviet Union such as Georgia, Moldova, 
Belarus, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have become new sources of arms delivery to 
the Horn sub-region (Project Ploughshares, 1998/99). This is besides the 
continuing arms flow from traditional sources. The abundance of arms means the 
wider the spectrum of forces that use them (United Nations, 1997:86-95).  
In a nutshell, conflict inter-linkage has made the Horn of Africa a region of 
"security complex", where insecurity in a country spills over to the other countries 
of the sub-region. In the sub-region domestic conflict in one country cannot be 
explained in isolation from the sub-regional security dilemma. This has presented 
practical challenges to conflict resolution and post-conflict peace management 
efforts throughout the second-half of the twentieth century, the effects of which 
persist to the present.  
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Conflict in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa: Changes and 
Continuities  
The end of the East-West conflict and the dramatic change in the post-Second 
World War global order has had implications for the Horn of Africa. Despite the 
interplay of local, regional and global political and economic dynamics, the 
transformations that have taken place in the sub-region are contradictory in terms. 
To start with, the end of the cold-war has led to the loosening of the ideological 
bonds the Horn states had with their respective superpower patron: the erosion of 
the source of their strong foreign support. This weakened the authoritarian regimes 
in the Horn states, thereby altering the dynamics of conflict in the African Horn. 
With the weakening of the authoritarian regimes some dissident groups that were 
dissatisfied with the nature of allocation of resources (both economic and political) 
were able to control state power; some others successfully pressed for exit or 
greater autonomy using region, religion or ethnicity as instruments for support 
mobilization. The Horn of Africa in post-cold war era also witnessed both state-
collapse (Somalia) and the birth of new states – Eritrea, the Republic of 
Somaliland, and Southern Sudan.  
In Ethiopia and Somalia, insurgency movements ousted the politically, 
economically and militarily weakened regimes. With the fall of the Said Barre 
regime, the Somali State collapsed and the southern part, the former Italian colony, 
was sliced into many unruly clan-based ‘fiefdoms’ fighting for power and 
economic resources (Medhane, 2002); and Somaliland, the former British colony, 
declared its partition. No political and diplomatic efforts towards restoring peace 
and security in Somalia could bear fruit. None of the warring warlord factions also 
could impose its will upon others to establish a central authority for Somalia. The 
Transitional National Government (TNG) – the outcome of the 2000 Arta 
Conference in Djibouti – could not last long; the existing Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) is also not doing well.  
The collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia led to different 
developments. The TPLF and the EPLF, the rebel forces that ousted the Derg 
established effective control in Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively. While the 
EPLF made Eritrea a de facto independent state that became de jure through the 
referendum held in May 1993, the TPLE-led EPRDF established a transitional 
government in Ethiopia in July 1991. The EPRDF-led Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia (TGE) recognized Eritrea’s independence. The resolution of Eritrea’s 
problem enabled the EPRDF coalition government to consolidate its rule in 
Ethiopia, and concentrate on its model of state-building project. 
The authoritarian regimes of President Daniel arap Moi and President Gouled 
in Kenya and Djibouti respectively underwent “self-transformation” to democracy 
and multiparty politics as the strategy of survival. In the Sudan, however, the 
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regime of the National Islamic Front (NIF) remained adamant to its Islamist 
ideology, and continued pursuing the policy of military solution for the conflict 
with the Southern Sudanese movements, until the 2005 détente mentioned above.  
With regard to inter-state politics, there emerged a phenomenon of détente, as 
regimes of the states of the sub-region seemed to have committed themselves for 
peace and cooperation during the first-half of the 1990s. Particularly Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Sudan took the lead to take the position of mutual non-interference in 
each other’s “internal affairs” (Cliffe, 1999:3) The most spectacular example is 
following the rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Khartoum, the EPRDF 
government closed down SPLM/A’s operational bases in Ethiopia. For the SPLM 
this meant that it out-stayed its welcome by Ethiopia. Regional summits were 
frequented between Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Khartoum. There also emerged an 
atmosphere of collaboration to strengthening the Inter-Governmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD) and assisting the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
renamed the African Union (AU) in 2002, in resolving conflicts in the continent. 
With the euphoria of new office and the need for gaining international legitimacy, 
and, while competing for regional leadership-role, the government of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea were among the prime initiators of "the new order" for Africa and the Horn. 
They also made a series of mediation efforts to resolve the conflicts in the Horn of 
Africa. This prompted observers of the affairs of the sub-region to characterize the 
Horn states’ mood of the period as,  
 
For the first time for decades – maybe in history – all the countries of the 
Horn actually do live in peace with each other…Thus there are no more open 
conflicts between the states (Cliffe, 1999:3). 
 
Thus, seeking peaceful resolution of conflicts in the sub-region, and 
institutionalizing the attitude of cooperation for mutual security characterized 
inter-state politics of the first half of the 1990s. This however did not last long; 
reversal to regional conflict and mutual intervention resumed after 1993. In 1993, 
Eritrea started accusing Sudan of infiltrating anti-regime forces (namely, the 
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - EIJM) into Eritrea to destabilize the Asmara 
regime of President Issayas Afeworki. Sudan on its part accused Eritrea of 
sponsoring the Sudanese dissidents in Eastern Sudan (Amare Tekle, 1996:505). 
Relations between the two countries further worsened when Eritrea publicly 
pledged to support the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which included 
various Sudanese opposition forces (Amare Tekle, 1996:506; Horn of Africa 
Bulletin. 1998: 30). The two countries broke off diplomatic relations and the 
Sudanese Embassy in Asmara turned to be an office for NDA. The Government of 
the new Eritrea, as was not consolidated politically and its economy in shambles, 
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as still is, entertained fear of insecurity that influenced the country’s regional 
behavior. Asmara developed aggressive and confrontational regional foreign 
policy that brought it into conflict with its neighbors on both sides of the Red Sea.  
The promising start in Ethio-Sudanese relations in the early 1990s, when the 
two countries showed the gesture of friendship and cooperation and signed a 
number of agreements to that effect (Sosina, 1994: 7), began to deteriorate. The 
situation further worsened when Ethiopia accused Sudan of interfering in its 
internal affairs by supporting Ethiopian dissident movements, most of them, 
allegedly, with Islamic orientation (Amare, 1996: 506). Ethiopia's fear of threat 
from Sudan was confirmed by the statement of Hassan el-Turabi, an ideologue of 
radical Islam. Turabi’s statement reads, "Ethiopia will self-destruct in the near 
future, thus giving the way for the establishment of an Islamic Oromo state and 
resulting in a chain of Islamic polities extending from Sudan to the Indian Ocean" 
(Amare, 1996:505). Ethiopia also accused Sudan of complicity in the assassination 
attempt against Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian President, in Addis Ababa while he 
was arriving at Bole International Airport for the June 1995 OAU Summit. 
Ethiopia demanded the handover of the suspected terrorists to Ethiopia, and took 
the case to the UN Security Council when Sudan refused the demand. Subsequent 
developments led to the worsening of the relations of the two countries. The level 
of diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa was reduced and the 
number of diplomatic personnel was significantly cut.  
Feeling insecure around its border, Ethiopia also argued that there were 
destabilizing forces operating in Somalia taking the advantage of lack of a central 
government there. In a hot pursuit of what it perceived the destabilizing forces, 
Ethiopia also moved to violate the Somali border during the second half of the 
1990s. Cross-border anti-government movements caused similar tensions between 
Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a military pact in 1963 against 
the five-pointed star of “Greater Somalia” policy and have had remarkably good 
political relations. Ethio-Kenyan relations were not affected much even during the 
revolutionary period in Ethiopia.  
With the outbreak of Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998, new regional re-alignment 
of forces began forming. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea sought rapprochement with 
Sudan. Having been denied access to Assab and Massawa ports, Ethiopia also 
came closer to Djibouti for port service, if not for classical balance-of-power 
politics per se. Again with the shift in the pattern of regional alliance, Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Yemen (from across the Red Sea) entered a tripartite entente, called the 
Sana’a Forum, in 2002 with, arguably, the intent to contain Eritrea, their common 
nemesis. The Forum was later joined by Somalia and Djibouti which has created 
some apprehension on the part of Eritrea, which remains the odd one out in the 
region.  
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In final analysis, the re-emergence of inter-state tensions, a new cycle of 
mutual insurgency support resurfaced in the Horn of Africa. The north-south 
conflict in Sudan intensified; and with the obvious assistance from neighbours the 
southern Sudanese rebel forces succeeded in controlling larger territories in the 
southern Sudan. The regional conflict system of the cold-war era, which was 
replaced by a temporary détente, re-emerged. This dashed the hope in the early 
1990s to resolve the conflicts in the sub-region in a concerted effort (Kiplagat, 
2000).  
 
Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: The Need for a new 
Approach  
The concept ‘conflict resolution’ is about the effort to create an environment in 
which competition over scarce resources and state power would not lead to lethal 
conflicts. Conflict resolution requires understanding of the root causes of conflicts 
and putting in place institutions and procedures to forge and foster peaceful 
relations within and between states. In the Horn, different efforts have been made 
to manage and resolve conflicts at different times. But all have failed to bring the 
intended results largely because the attempts have been partly power-centered, and 
partly based on incorrect understanding of the source of the conflicts. Another 
outstanding problem has been the propensity to use force by belligerent parties 
(state vs. state, or state vs. its opposition). As mentioned, most of the time 
governments of the states of the Horn Africa had been and are authoritarian that 
arbitrarily used force to resolve local and international conflicts. This has also 
influenced/shaped the thinking and actions of anti-regime forces in the sub-region.  
Besides the political actors’ propensity to use force as an instrument of policy, 
the conflicts in the sub-region, as has been discussed, also have interlinkage. In 
view of this, conflict resolution and the post-conflict peace and security 
management in the Horn require a new approach. Attempts at resolving the 
conflicts in the sub-region have to take place on regional basis, not on the 
traditional conflict-to-conflict basis. Differently put, resolving the Horn conflict 
system requires what I would call “peace-system approach”, a regional-system 
strategy of attaining and sustaining peace and security. This means, as the conflicts 
in the Horn are interlinked in many complex ways, concentrating only on issue(s) 
between conflicting/warring parties at a particular level would not lead to enduring 
solution. Conflict resolution and post-conflict peace management requires an all-
inclusive approach. Thus, there must be local-regional frameworks for conflict 
resolution, which in turn requires political goodwill from the part of policymakers 
of the states of the sub-region.  
The often unhealthy relations and the frequent shift of alignment and re-
alignment of forces in the Horn have made it difficult for effective regional 
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institutions of cooperation for security and development to emerge and mature. 
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the 
sub-regional organization that was established in 1986 for coordinating the 
member states’ policies mainly on environmental issues. As it could not play a 
significant role in bringing about the benefits of regionalism to the sub-region, 
IGADD was restructured in 1996, when there was the sprit of cooperation among 
the states of the Horn. The invigorated organization is to serve as a regional 
security organization, renamed the ‘Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD). Cognizant of the danger of violent local conflicts with regional spillover-
effect, IGAD the member states restructured the organization and gave it expanded 
mandate thereby making political, security, humanitarian, and economic affairs its 
priority areas. 
However, the reversal in the pattern of regional inter-state politics dashed the 
organization’s hope to move the sub-region up on the security ladder. The new 
cycle of mistrust as well as rivalries for regional leadership that resurfaced in the 
second half of the 1990s among the Horn states dashed the hope to resolve 
conflicts and promote inter-state cooperation in the interest of mutual security. 
Conflicts and shifting alliance formations have incapacitated IGAD to deal with 
issues of security and development. Encountered credibility gap due to its member 
states’ partisan posture, the role IGAD could play to resolve conflicts – both intra-
state and inter-state – in the Horn of Africa is very marginal.  
This is not to dismiss the role of IGAD, but to underscore that it needs to be 
empowered and to have a new vision to realize its mission as a regional security 
organization. Put differently, empowered IGAD acting as a neutral regional 
mediator – not as a partial power broker –can build and promote its credibility and 
legitimacy. As IGAD, the inter-governmental agency, is vulnerable to political 
obstacles and, thus, unable to deal with conflicts and coordinate regional security 
policies of its member states measures like professionalizing its staff, giving it 
necessary autonomy to operate outside of state sovereignty, and bringing the 
influence of the civil society into its operations by putting in place institutions like 
a regional parliament are important tasks ahead.  
There are several justifications why cooperation is necessary in the Horn 
(Medhane, 2004; Tafesse, 1998).  As the root causes of conflicts in the sub-region 
are interlinked, operating in a regional framework will have economic, political, 
social, and environmental security benefits (Markakis, 1998). Regional 
cooperation enables coordinated and regulated use of shared resources (Medhane, 
2004). Unregulated utilization of shared resources does not only cause and 
perpetuate conflicts, but worsens their devastating consequences. In the light of 
this, institutionalized regional cooperation would help avoid existing psycho-
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political barrier and provide confidence-building measures in intra-state and inter-
state relations.  
Even though the state as the dominant actor in international relations is no 
longer sacrosanct in light of the bourgeoning role of non-state actors, it still 
remains the major actor. The sovereign state commands the power of 
allocating/distributing national resources. Owing to this fact, it remains to be the 
main organizing actor both at the national and international levels. It also will 
continue to play crucial role even in the performance of global organizations in the 
foreseeable future. The role of the state in the Horn of Africa sub-system is not an 
exception. Given this universal role of the state, achievement of peace and security 
in the Horn, at both local and regional levels, requires change in the modus 
operandi of state leaders in the sub-region. Both wielders of state power and those 
who aspire for office must convince themselves of the need to emphasize on peace, 
security and economic development at both domestic and regional levels. The 
international community also has to play positive role in this regard. In short, 
institutionalizing procedures for fair-share of resources (power and wealth) in the 
interest of peace within and between states can alter the hitherto existing unhealthy 
nature of state-state and state-society relations in the Horn of Africa.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper has tried to underline that an incorrect understanding of the root causes 
of conflict leads to unrealistic conflict resolution and post-conflict peace 
management strategies in the Horn of Africa. The failure of the U.S. led-UN 
mission in Somalia (UNISOM) in the early 1990s and the border demarcation 
efforts to end the Ethio-Eritrean "border dispute" are the prime examples of this. 
The UNISOM failed to meet its intended mission because of its lack of knowledge 
of how politics is organized and played out in Somalia. Efforts at Ethiopian-
Eritrean border demarcation could not succeed largely because of incorrect 
understanding of the root cause of the conflict that erupted into open warfare 
between these sisterly countries in May 1998. In view of this even if the border-
demarcation process were succeeded, it would not bring about normalization of 
relations between the two countries. As long as one of the parties (Eritrea in this 
case) would feel its prime intention has not been met, and consider itself as a 
“loser” the problem would remain unresolved.  
Another disturbing concern about the conflict in the Horn is the prevailing 
divergent administrative structures and political organizations of the states of the 
sub-region. Ethiopia has adopted ethnicity as a basis for state and political party 
organization. While Eritrea is a de jure one-party state, in Djibouti, the country that 
apparently has accepted the principle of multiparty democracy, the ethnic-Afar still 
feels political and economic marginalization. In Kenya the tendency is to 
     Tafesse Olika  
 
 20
marginalize political parties of stronger ethnic groups in favor of smaller ones with 
a view not to jeopardize the primacy of the country’s ruling party (Wanjohi, 1997). 
While Somalia is still with an unclear future, Sudan has witnessed disintegration 
with the South Sudan becoming an independent state while still leaving analysts 
with regard to how the North-South relations would proceed in the future.  
This paper argued that political dynamics are the root causes of conflict and 
insecurity in the Horn of Africa. It also argued that the way the cause of the 
conflicts is understood determines the mechanisms to be put in place for conflict 
resolution and post-conflict peace management. This calls for a shopping-list of 
policy measures necessary to rise to the challenges of the problem of security. The 
following scenarios are suggested to this end.  
 
Scenario 1 
The conventional/traditional approach to the study of security in the Horn sub-
region is dominated, by what I may call ‘layered approach’, i.e. to analyze the 
issue of conflict at different levels that generally tend to explain that conflicts 
occur horizontally. Put differently, the traditional explanations of the conflict in the 
sub-region tend to be periphery versus periphery approach, emphasizing issues of 
identity markers such as religion, region, and ethnicity. Such an approach to 
conflict study in the final analysis makes the state out of the scene. If the problem 
of security is to be addressed it is imperative to correct this approach and 
emphasize on the centrality of the role the state in conflicts.  
 
Scenario 2 
Owing to the centrality of the role of the state in conflict democratization of the 
state-society relations is imperative. The central argument of this paper is that 
security and democracy are closely intertwined. Conflict is the phenomenon that 
emanates from lack of good governance; that is, inter alia, lack of popular 
participation in the process of decision making (Olufemi 2000: 227), and lack of 
accountability of political power holders for their policy commission and omission. 
Hence, to efficiently rise to the challenges of the problem of conflict and security 
in the Horn is an urgent need for democratizing the politics of the region, at both 
national and regional levels.  
 
Scenario 3 
It must be noted that the primacy of security can not be over-emphasized owing to 
the fact that without security it is not possible for both political and economic 
actors to plan to undertake any activity of national and regional importance. The 
myriad of negative impacts conflicts pose at all stages where they are played is 
obvious. They divert policymakers’ attention, their time and energy and, more 
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importantly, the economic resources of the concerned nation or nations from 
development drives. At the same time, particularly in sub-regions like the Horn, 
conflicts spill over from one level to the other, like a cyclone which has no regard 
for frontiers, so to say. On the other hand, the states in the Horn, although they 
share socio-cultural values emanating from centuries-old interactions, do not have 
shared political values and culture. In view of this, the need for democratization, 
suggested in Scenario 2 above, will avoid the bad government-to-government 
relations and help bring the desired shared political values to the fore. This will no 
doubt make it possible for policy harmonization to collectively rise to the problem 
of security in the Horn sub-region.  
 
Scenario 4 
Rising to the problem of security also demands mapping out a systematic and 
consistent program of policy formulation, analysis and action at individual state 
level and collectively at the regional level. The Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD) can be suggested as in charge for this task. And yet IGAD as 
an institution in place to deal with the issue of conflict and security mobilizing its 
security architecture is seriously constrained by the nature of politics in the Horn. 
In the first place, IGAD does not command requisite credibility from some 
member states: for instance, Eritrea has withdrawn its membership, Somalia is a 
failed state, and Somaliland is not a member state owing to the fact that it is still 
not given recognition. In addition, financial and technical resources available at the 
disposal of the Intergovernmental Authority are meager. IGAD also does not have 
a regional peacekeeping force under its own command. This again leaves the ball 
at the gate of member states. This means, there is a need for the political goodwill 
of the active member states to empower this regional institution politically, 
militarily and financially.  
 
Scenario 5 
Last but by no means the least, intra and inter-state conflicts in the Horn are also 
fed on and fueled by many forces and factors. Cross-border insurgency, terrorist 
activities, and illicit arms and drug trafficking have dangerous local and regional 
impact. While there is the need for concerted regional effort to curb this, once 
again Africa in general and the Horn sub-region in particular has also become the 
chess-board of different foreign powers. As this will create additional schisms in 
intra-state and inter-state politics, it is imperative for the Horn states to collectively 
design policies on how to deal with this new-turn involvement of foreign powers 
competing for the untapped resources of the region for their narrow interests. What 
must be emphasized here is competition among the states in the region for 
incautious partnership with these foreign powers coming from different corners of 
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the world might play into the hands of foreign companies that want increasingly 
generous incentives such as, for example, substantial tax reductions (Notshulwana 
2000: 175, in Junadu). This inevitably hurts economically this region of protracted 
poverty and politically erodes further regime legitimacy already based on 
narrow/shaky grounds.  
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